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THE MIGRATION OF RESISTANCE AND SOLIDARITY: ʻABD 
AL-QĀDIR AL-JAZĀʼIRĪ’S PROMOTION OF HIJRA1  
 
Abstract  
This paper examines how Algerian resistance figure al-Amir ʻAbd al-Qādir 
(1808–1883) promoted migration by tying it to proper Islamic practice and to 
Muslim solidarity. The analysis illustrates how ʻAbd al-Qādir mapped out his 
world and understood the fight he was leading beyond anachronistic 
nationalist narratives. This is achieved by reading his legal ruling alongside 
primary sources from the same period. The amir is shown to be both a political 
strategist who used Islamic concepts to mobilize the population in his vicinity 






When the angels take away from their bodies the souls of those who 
have wronged themselves, they will ask them, "How did you live?" 
They will reply, "We lived on earth in weakness and oppression."  
The angels will say, "Was not God's land vast enough for you to go 
wherever you could live in peace?" (Qur’an 4:97)  
 
NEW BOUNDARIES: MIGRATION STUDIES AND ISLAMIC TEXTS 
While Migration Studies has made strides in considering movement 
beyond the model of nation-state borders,2 there is still a gap in the 
conceptual history of migration from before colonization. This is an 
area where texts normally considered the purview of Islamic Studies 
can enrich the field with new geographic concepts and a more 
expansive historical trajectory. Texts including epistles, legal rulings, 
and travelogues reveal how North African and Middle Eastern leaders 
and literati gave meaning to migration during different moments in 
history. Although the terms through which migration was understood 
and interpreted in the precolonial period were derived from faith 
traditions, this does not make such texts less intellectual or political. In 
fact, they offer unique access into how historical actors understood 
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migration during several critical periods, including on the eve of 
colonialization.  
This paper demonstrates how North African scholar and 
anticolonial resistance leader al-Amir ʻAbd al-Qādir al-Jazāʼirī (1808–
1883) tied migration to resistance and solidarity by evoking the Islamic 
concept of hijra. ʻAbd al-Qādir was not the first Maghribi (North 
African) scholar to associate hijra—meaning migration out of territory 
ruled by non-Muslims—with social and spiritual redemption. 3 
However, as I will show, his fatwa arguing for hijra as an absolute duty 
stood out in the context of the nineteenth century. It marked him as the 
leading figure of resistance among other North African scholars’ calls 
for Muslims to accept foreign rule or to focus solely on the continuation 
of religious rites.  
Al-Amir ʻAbd al-Qādir held multiple, complementary roles 
over the course of his life. During times of war, he was western 
Algeria’s primary military strategist. As a statesman, he influenced the 
geopolitical boundaries of his time through the two treaties he 
negotiated with the French, as well as his campaign to facilitate hijra. 
In his texts, he then actively shaped the meanings given to these 
changing geographies. In a context of massive political upheaval, ʻAbd 
al-Qādir asserted strong boundaries of religious belonging and made 
migration out of enemy-controlled lands the only means of social and 
spiritual preservation. His ruling reveals that geographic concepts 
which are now taken for granted—such as the entities of France and 
Europe—were not part of the precolonial schema; the boundaries 
which mattered were those of religious jurisdiction. While Arabic and 
Islamic thought from this period is often framed in terms of reform or 
revival via focus on the Nahda movement, the amir did not attempt to 
reform ideas around territory and migration. He looked instead to how 
these categories had previously informed Muslims’ migrations and 
then applied them to the circumstances of his time. He did so using 
examples from Islamic history, thereby tying his struggle to a longer 
tradition and also actively preserving this inheritance in the face of 
political threat.  
This leads to the question of sources. Although postcolonial 
histories of the nineteenth century provide useful social and political 
context, it is difficult to escape their centering of nation-state 
development. Al-Amir ʻAbd al-Qādir, for example, has been 
transformed into an independence symbol and his emirate is often 
framed as a predecessor to the nation.4 While multiple readings of ̒ Abd 
al-Qādir’s legacy add to its overall richness, this nationalist framing 
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overrides his own conceptions of territory, political boundaries, and 
migration. By contrast, reading his text alongside the works of those 
who actually lived through the colonial invasions offers direct access 
to how migration and asylum were understood at the time. Thus, this 
paper’s methodology is to place ʻAbd al-Qādir’s fatwa on hijra in the 
context of a larger Maghribi dialogue around Muslims’ duty either to 
wage jihad against foreign invaders and/or to emigrate from under 
their rule. After reviewing this dialogue, the paper moves to a brief 
biographical overview which includes the points at which the amir 
sought fatwas from other authorities and the circumstances which led 
him to write his own. As the ruling shows, migration was not meant as 
a passive disengagement from conflict. On the eve of colonialism, hijra 
became an expression of Muslim solidarity and a means to resist the 
violent enforcement of outsiders’ political and cultural norms.  
 
TO FIGHT, FLEE, OR FOLD: THE TERMS OF THE HIJRA AND JIHAD 
DEBATES 
As mentioned previously, al-Amir ʻAbd al-Qādir wrote his ruling as 
part of a larger Islamic dialogue around the proper response to the 
colonial threat. Anxieties regarding living among non-Muslims or 
under their authority shaped textual production and political action 
throughout this period. This is particularly true in the context of North 
Africa, where colonized and uncolonized regions sat side by side for 
decades, allowing for the possibility of migration out of newly 
conquered lands. The nineteenth-century dialogue was, in turn, built 
upon previous Islamic texts. The concept of hijra was already a strong 
component of the North African cultural memory, given the history of 
Muslim Iberia, Portuguese settlements on the Moroccan coast, and 
Muslim Sicily. Hijra was then revisited in the context of the colonial 
invasions, particularly after the fall of Algiers in 1830. Scholars in Fez, 
Algiers, and elsewhere revisited Muslim-Christian relations in Islamic 
law, including the status and rights of Muslims living under Christian 
rule and whether they must migrate.  
Hijra is mentioned several times in the Qur’an, and is embodied 
in the sunna by the Prophet’s migration from Mecca to Medina. 5 
Although the terms dar al-Harb (the domain of war) and dar al-Islam (the 
domain of peace) are not used in the Qur’an, they appear in the Islamic 
archive starting with ninth-century exegesis works, particularly Jāmiʻ 
al-bayān fī tafsīr al-Qurʼān (Comprehensive Exposition of the 
Interpretation of the Qur'an) by the Abbasid era scholar al-Ṭabari ̄ (d. 
923). The terms bilād al-muslimin or bila ̄d al-Islam are also sometimes 
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used instead of dar al-Islam in the legal literature of Muslim North and 
West Africa, where the Maliki school dominates. As bilād terms 
denoting regions such as bila ̄d al-sudan or bila ̄d al-sham show, using bilād 
gives a sense of loose affiliation based on proximity as opposed to a 
coherent territory under one rule. 
Only slightly before ʻAbd al-Qādir’s time, hijra was employed 
in the state-building undertaken by another Sufi warrior: Usman Dan 
Fodio (1754–1817) of Northern Nigeria.6  There are several parallels 
between the life and texts of Dan Fodio and that of al-Amir ʻAbd al-
Qādir. Although Dan Fodio was fighting adjacent African polities and 
not a colonial invasion, his jihad was launched from a roving military 
camp similar to the amir’s smala.7  Both men used the Qur’an, the 
hadith, and the Maliki archive to argue that hijra was an absolute duty, 
and then in turn used hijra to promote solidarity with their campaigns. 
ʻAbd al-Qādir even makes some points similar to those made by Dan 
Fodio in the latter’s 1806 epistle Bayān Wujūb al-Hijra ʻala al-ʻIbād 
(Exposition of the Obligation of Emigration Upon God’s Servants). Like 
the amir, Dan Fodio asserts that it is only acceptable for Muslims to live 
in a land if it is under Islamic rule.8  The implication was that all 
Muslims within his vicinity needed to show solidarity with their feet 
and migrate into his territory.   
Although Dan Fodio represents an interesting precedent, not 
every nineteenth-century scholar focused on Islamic rule as the 
defining factor in where Muslims can live, or connected migration with 
solidarity, or even called for a jihad against the colonizers. For example, 
Muḥammad ibn al-Shāhid (d. 1837) was the mufti of Algiers when it 
fell to the French, and his fatwa on hijra focuses on the ability to 
perform religious rites rather than on the presence of an Islamic ruler. 
He also implies that solidarity can mean remaining with other Muslims 
in an occupied territory. In his ruling, Ibn al-Shāhid asserts to his 
unnamed opponents—scholars who proposed the excommunication of 
Muslims willingly living under French rule—that “We do not submit 
that this verse [Qur’an 4:97] points to the unconditional obligation of 
hijra, but rather to the obligation of hijra upon he who cannot practice 
his religion.”9 Ibn al-Shāhid then explains that even for Muslims who 
could not practice their religion and do not fall under the Qur’anic 
exemption of the weak (mustaḍʻafīn), their failure to perform hijra is at 
most disobedience to God and still not grounds for excommunication 
(takfir).10 After making the indignant assertion that his interlocutors’ 
takfir of the ‘ulama’  of Algiers equally excommunicates the noble 
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‘ulama’ of Cairo, Ibn al-Shāhid presents an original justification against 
migration:   
 
For the ‘ulama’ are like the doctors of the masses’ faith. If we 
imagined that they made hijra and moved away, then the 
common people would not find one to remedy their faith and 
they may fall into unbelief. For that reason [the ‘ulama’ of Al-
Azhar] disregarded hijra—may God be pleased with them—
and the reason they disregarded it is the reason our ‘ulama’ 
disregarded it.11 
 
Clearly Ibn al-Shāhid was defending his own decision to remain 
in Algiers, as well as that of his associates. He does so by placing more 
importance on the day-to-day social reality of Muslims than on the 
political or judicial structures they live under. While he concedes that 
the occupiers destroyed some mosques, he points out that the Muslims 
of Algiers are still sounding the call to prayer and worshipping as 
required.12 He also dedicates a lot of space to warning his interlocutors 
against defaming other Muslims, and makes this a bigger breach of 
solidarity than neglecting hijra. On top of these aspects, Ibn al-Shāhid 
defends the ‘ulama’ in particular by stating that they must remain 
among Muslims in occupied territories so that they will not stray into 
unbelief. This version of solidarity does not call for migration out of 
foreign-controlled lands or resistance to non-Muslim occupiers, as a 
Muslim ruler is not seen as a requirement. It is worth noting, however, 
that Ibn al-Shāhid never actually argues that he is living within dar al-
Islam. When he rebukes his opponents, he does so by reminding them 
that they should be “of the practical scholars of the umma,” and the 
concept of umma is used both for its emotional resonance and because 
it is not tied to a specific, bounded geography or associated with an 
Islamic political structure.13  
Even after the rest of Algeria was conquered, the debate around 
hijra continued. Fez-based jurist al-Shaikh al-Mahdī al-Wazzāni ̄ (1850–
1923) reinterpreted an influential Maliki fatwa by Ahmad al-
Wansharīsi ̄ (d. 1508) outlawing residence in dar al-Harb.14 In a bid to 
maintain the Moroccan sultan’s air of legitimacy despite increasing 
European interference, al-Wazzānī disputed al-Wansharīsi ̄ and argued 
for a more flexible definition of bilād al-Islam. He evoked “the opinion 
held by some scholars that bilād al-Islam does not become dar al-harb 
at the very moment [bi-mujarrad] the infidels capture it. Rather, with 
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the rupture [inqita'] of Islamic rites [sha'a'ir al-Islam] and as long as the 
Islamic rites or most of them continue, it does not become dar al-
harb.”15 As with Ibn al-Shāhid’s fatwa, al-Wazzāni ̄’s use of bila ̄d (lands 
of) instead of dar (domain of) still subtly concedes that this territory is 
not within Islam’s dominion, even if it is not fully enemy territory either.  
Through reading this fatwa in conjunction with Dan Fodio’s 
and Ibn al-Shāhid’s, the terms of the debate on hijra become clear. 
While, on the one hand, there were those who focused on the necessity 
of Islamic rule for proper Islamic practice, on the other were scholars 
who focused on the continuation of religious rituals in everyday life. 
Both camps looked to Maliki legal precedence to make their arguments. 
While interpretations of the Qur'anic verse 4:97 (quoted at the 
beginning of this article) could vary, there was no variance in 
considering it vital to the discussion. All three rulings also cite al-
Wansharīsi ̄, even if it is in order to refute him.  
As al-Amir ‘Abd al-Qa ̄dir’s call for hijra was closely tied to his 
resistance movement, the period’s dialogue around jihad merits review. 
As historians such as Julia Clancy-Smith and David Robinson have 
demonstrated, 16  North African political responses to colonialism 
varied greatly and often included forms of concession or 
accommodation. Similar to the discourse around hijra there was not a 
unifying, monolithic understanding of whether jihad was obligatory or 
desirable. However, even the rulings against armed resistance 
emphasized the necessity of Muslim solidarity for waging jihad. For 
example, the Fez-based jurist al-Shaikh ̒ Alī al-Simlāli ̄ (d. 1925) pointed 
to the internal divisions in Morocco as evidence that a resistance 
campaign would not succeed, and mentions both the lack of unity 
among the tribes and the divided loyalties of Moroccans under the 
protection of European consulates.17 His associate Ah ̣mad ibn Khālid 
al-Nās ̣iri ̄ (1834–97) also provided legal warning against undertaking 
jihad, pointing to Morocco’s defeats at both the Battle of Isly (1844) and 
the Battle of Tétouan (1860) before alluding to the divided nature of 
Morocco. He states that the Muslims must be as “one hand” in order to 
win the war.18  
When al-Amir ʻAbd al-Qādir wrote about hijra and solidarity, 
he was neither entirely original in his argument nor merely a passive 
transmitter of tradition. The terms of the debate were set by other 
scholars and, importantly, by the Maliki legal corpus and the larger 
Islamic archive. Yet, the amir also used these concepts to make a 
specific intervention in the wider dialogue, and he drew conclusions 
contrary to that of many other scholars. Before showing how he tied 
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migration to solidarity and resistance, it is important to understand the 
outlines of his jihad.  
 
‘ABD AL-QADIR’S JIHAD OF THE PEN AND THE SWORD  
As text and resistance were closely intertwined in the Maghrib during 
this period, this section constitutes a brief review of al-Amir ʻAbd al-
Qādir’s life and legacy, including his participation in the larger legal 
dialogue. ʻAbd al-Qādir bin Muḥyī al-Dīn was born in the village of El 
Guettana in the Mascara province of Algeria the year 1808. His father 
Muḥyī al-Dīn led the local branch of the Qādiri ̄yya Sufi brotherhood, a 
position of both spiritual authority and temporal power. Genealogy 
was an important political tool in the Maghrib, and the family claimed 
descent from the Prophet Muhammad through the Idrisid founders of 
Fez. 19  This lineage later helped ʻAbd al-Qādir tie his jihad to the 
Moroccan sultan’s dynasty, as the royal family also claimed Sharif 
status through the Idrisid line. 20  Algeria was under Ottoman rule 
during ʻAbd al-Qādir’s early life, and the western region had a 
considerable history of Sufi-led rebellions against the Ottoman bey.21 
Thus, while Muḥyi ̄ al-Dīn may not have anticipated the French 
invasion, he was likely grooming his son to lead an uprising of some 
kind. Muḥyī al-Dīn laid the groundwork for ʻAbd al-Qādir’s 
ascendance after the two returned from their pilgrimage to Mecca. 
Stories then circulated of how Muḥyī al-Dīn had received divine 
visions of his son becoming sultan at the grave of Sufi saint ʻAbd al-
Qādir al-Jilanī in Baghdad.22 Such Sufi visions and miracle tales were 
another form of political legitimacy in the precolonial Maghrib,23 and 
this particular vision was confirmed by another noble of the province.24 
Then, shortly after ʻAbd al-Qādir and Muḥyī al-Di ̄n’s return from 
Mecca, the French captured Algiers.25  
The fall of Algiers led to a power vacuum in western Algeria 
and, at the request of the ‘ulama’ of Tlemcen, the Moroccan Sultan 
Mawlay ʻAbd al-Raḥman (r. 1822–1859) sent a delegation to accept 
their oath of loyalty and incorporate the city into his dominion. The 
‘ulama’ of Fez, however, warned the sultan against accepting territory 
under Ottoman jurisdiction and ultimately the occupation was short-
lived. Despite its brevity, this event had important implications for 
ʻAbd al-Qādir’s political career. The sultan named Muḥyi ̄ al-Dīn his 
khalifa and the inheritor of the jihad after he withdrew, but Muḥyī al-
Di ̄n was wary of taking on this responsibility in his old age. When local 
tribes then offered him an oath of loyalty, he suggested they follow his 
son ̒ Abd al-Qādir in his place. ̒ Abd al-Qādir was officiated in 1832 and 
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led a procession to Mascara where he was ceremonially installed in the 
Ottoman bey’s former residence. He soon subdued the most rebellious 
tribes and captured nearby Tlemcen. Internal strife remained a feature 
of western Algeria and ʻAbd al-Qādir continually referred to the 
problem of dissenting factions in his correspondence and texts.   
Shortly after coming to power, the amir began to solicit the 
General Desmichels regarding a treaty. He also reached out to the 
Moroccan sultan, who eventually replied with gifts and supplies in 
1834. The Desmichels Treaty of the same year meant French recognition 
of the amir’s sovereignty over the interior of western Algeria.26 The 
treaty was ̒ Abd al-Qādir’s first chance to implement his stance on hijra: 
one of its conditions was that Algerians living in French-controlled 
territory could elect to migrate to his emirate. Particularly influential to 
the amir’s career, however, was the 1837 Treaty of Tafna. For the two 
years following this treaty’s ratification, he focused on state-building 
and even approached outside nations for recognition of his emirate. It 
was also in this period that he corresponded with Islamic legal experts 
regarding the proper way to respond to internal rebellions. These 
exchanges would lay the groundwork for him to later make his own 
argument for the necessity of hijra.  
In 1835, two years before ̒ Abd al-Qādir first corresponded with 
Islamic scholars, General Camille Alphonse Trézel took the reins from 
General Desmichels and promptly broke his predecessor’s treaty. Not 
only did Trézel enter into an agreement with the Dawayir and Zamala 
tribes which put them under his jurisdiction and compelled them to aid 
his raids, the general also wrote to ʻAbd al-Qādir demanding that he 
relinquish sovereignty over them.27 Although ʻAbd al-Qādir defeated 
Trézel at the battle of the Maqta and Trézel was subsequently 
dismissed, ʻAbd al-Qādir remained wary of Algerian collaborators. He 
had other internal enemies as well, such as the Borjia tribe which 
assassinated one of his tax collectors.28 He was even betrayed by his 
own tribe after the French temporarily seized Mascara. Before bringing 
Islamic boundaries into writing, he enforced them with his speeches 
and policies. For example, after reentering Mascara in 1835, he made 
the residents evacuate their town for forty-eight days and admonished 
them: “I shall never enter, except for praying in a mosque, any town 
which you abandoned to be polluted by the Christians. Know also that 
I shall punish with death any individual entering relations with the 
enemy.”29  
Thus, during an interlude of peace with the French, the amir 
approached the Moroccan authorities for textual support of his right to 
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draw new lines on the Maghribi map and to use force against Muslims 
who failed to uphold them. In this 1837 istiftā’ (request for a ruling), the 
amir emphasizes his desire to take the Islamically sound course of 
action regarding rebellious factions within his sphere—a topic the 
Moroccan rulers had extensive experience with from their efforts to 
exert authority in tribal regions or bila ̄d al-siba.30 The sultan, in turn, 
presented these questions to the Fez-based jurist ̒ Alī ibn ̒ Abd al-Salām 
al-Tassūli ̄ (d. 1842), who responded with a lengthy text covering how 
the rebellious tribes were dealt with historically, guidance on 
punishing spies and usurpers, items which Muslims cannot sell to 
Christians, and why the imam must not turn a blind eye when his 
subjects are sinning.31  Al-Tassūli ̄ cautions his reader that the tribes 
operate on a principle of ‘asabiya (tribal solidarity) instead of the rule of 
sharia, and so they will protect the sinner among them. Thus, the 
ruling’s essence is that when Muslims do not embody solidarity and 
respect religious boundaries in various social spheres, they not only can 
be punished but should be punished. It also endorsed hijra as the proper 
response to an infidel invasion, with exemptions for those who are very 
ill.32  
Around this time ‘Abd al-Qādir started disseminating an 
unwritten call for hijra, but he was not yet framing it as an absolute 
duty for all Muslims. He dispatched representatives to French-
controlled towns where they offered housing and subsistence to 
families who agreed to leave. His emissary Mawlūd bin 'Arāsh spent 
most of his February 1838 visit to Algiers trying to coax the city’s 
leaders to emigrate. ʻAbd al-Qādir even told the French governor-
general of Algiers that he would pay off the debts of any of the city’s 
residents who wished to make hijra. At least 700 Algerians moved from 
Algiers to Abd al-Qādir’s territory that year.33  
When the peace negotiated between ʻAbd al-Qādir and the 
French military started falling apart in 1839— partly due to more tribes 
entering under French protection—the amir then sought new 
authorization from Fez. In this istiftā’, ʻAbd al-Qādir explains his 
situation in much more detail than in his first request. His description 
of Muslim defectors paints a picture of high stakes requiring decisive 
action:  
 
Peace and God’s blessings upon you. What is God’s rule 
regarding those who entered into obedience under the infidel 
enemy by their choice, promoted him and aided him, and [now] 
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fight Muslims with him? They take a salary like the members of 
his soldiery, and make plain their audacity towards the 
Muslims, and make it a sign upon their chests that they call 
“letter” with a picture of the [infidels’] King! Are they apostates? 
And if your response says they are, will they [be forced to] 
repent, or not? What is the ruling regarding their women, are 
they like their men or not? If you say they are like their men, 
must they also repent or else be killed or enslaved, as it was 
passed on from Ibn al-Mājishūn, or not?34  
 
ʻAbd al-Qādir’s initial request makes plain that he is contemplating 
harsh consequences for Algerians who betray his cause. In addition to 
a second and confirmatory response from al-Tassūli ̄, the Qadi Mawlāy 
'Abd al-Hādi ̄ (d. 1855) also issued a fatwa. Although 'Abd al-Hādi ̄ 
addresses ʻAbd al-Qādir as amir and as leader of the jihad, he gives the 
amir little leeway to unite those under his jurisdiction by force. Instead 
of emphasizing the imam’s duty to punish spies and traitors as did al-
Tassūlī, 'Abd al-Ha ̄dī recommends confiscating suspected rebels’ 
weapons but not their wealth. 'Abd al-Hādi ̄ also reminds ̒ Abd al-Qādir 
of the strict standards that need to be met in order to accuse other 
Muslims of apostasy:  
 
For al-Ghazāli ̄ said in his book The Difference Between Faith and 
Unbelief [that] what is needed is caution in declaring apostasy 
and what is found to its path, as desecrating the congregation 
that believes in God’s Oneness is an error. And the error in 
neglecting excommunication is lesser than the error of a 
Muslim’s blood.35 
 
In this excerpt, what it means to be a Muslim becomes less tied 
to political actions and almost solely dependent on belief. The ruling 
also ties the amir’s hands by making it more important to avoid libeling 
a believer than to address a believer’s breach of solidarity. Without the 
authority to banish rebellious factions from the Muslim sphere or 
forcefully bring them into it, ʻAbd al-Qādir would lose his ability to 
maintain and defend his emirate. It is at this point that ʻAbd al-Qādir 
wrote his fatwa urging Muslims to leave French-controlled territory 
and join his state which, by implication, meant supporting his jihad 
either through paying war taxes or joining his corps.  
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As the French advanced, ʻAbd al-Qādir moved onto Moroccan 
territory and started to gather support from tribes in Oudja and then in 
the Rif region. France attacked Morocco in retaliation for sheltering 
ʻAbd al-Qādir, and Morocco lost the Battle of Isly in 1844. The 
Moroccan court then started to use rhetoric around fasad (corruption) 
to deflect blame from the sultan and towards the supposedly disloyal 
elements within Morocco, including al-Amir ʻAbd al-Qādir.36 After the 
Moroccan sultan sent ʻAbd al-Qādir an ultimatum, he decided to 
surrender to the French in 1847. While he was promised safe passage 
to the Middle East if he gave himself up, the amir and his entourage 
were instead imprisoned in France for four years. At this point ʻAbd al-
Qādir lived by his words: just as he insisted in his fatwa that Muslims 
must live under Islamic rule, he refused offers of a handsome estate in 
France, citing his duty to live and pray among Muslims.37 
Al-Amir ʻAbd al-Qādir wrote an autobiography while 
imprisoned, as well as the bulk of a philosophical treatise.38 After ʻAbd 
al-Qādir was released, he contacted La Société Asiatique about 
translating the latter, and it was published as Le livre d'Abd-el-Kader 
intitulé: Rappel à l'intelligent, avis à l'indifférent (Abd-el-Kader’s Book 
Titled: Reminding the Intelligent, Alerting the Negligent) in 1858. After 
a couple of years in the Ottoman Turkish city of Bursa, he eventually 
settled in Damascus, where he taught at the Umayyad mosque. It was 
during this final period that he wrote his most lengthy and well-known 
text, Kita ̄b al-Mawāqif  (The Book of Stations). 39  Although his Sufi 
thought has been studied extensively, his other letters have not 
received as much attention.40 His fatwa is a unique source in that it 
reflects how the amir understood migration and Muslim solidarity 
while he was in the midst of fighting the French. It is also his only text 
to treat the subject of migration in-depth, although he briefly alludes to 
Algerian scholars’ call to migrate in his autobiography.41                            
 
‘ABD AL-QADIR’S MESSAGE: HIJRA IS THE ONLY MEANS TO 
REDEMPTION 
ʻAbd al-Qādir’s exact motivation for composing his own fatwa is 
unclear. Although he was likely unsatisfied with the ruling sent to him 
by the Qadi Mawla ̄y 'Abd al-Hādī, the amir had appointed judges 
within his own emirate by this time and could have solicited a ruling 
from one of them.42 The ruling is included in the biography written by 
ʻAbd al-Qādir’s son under the heading “That which the amir wrote in 
answer to a question put to him by certain persons of distinction,”43 
implying that the amir received an istiftā’. He also opens the fatwa with 
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“Dear brother, I saw how parched you were to hear what is needed of 
words about those who gathered to the enemy, and so I would like to 
mention what has been said about them.”44 Apparently other notables 
saw ʻAbd al-Qādir’s ruling as legally valid, as this fatwa was later used 
by al-Shaikh Qaddūr ibn Ruwi ̄la (d. 1856) and the Mufti ‘Alī ibn al-
H ̣affāf (d. 1890) to accuse Muslims dwelling in French territory of 
unbelief.45 There exists at least one manuscript copy of the ruling in 
Rabat, Morocco under the title Ḥusa ̄m al-dīn li-qat ̣ʻ shibh al-murtaddīn 
(The Sword of Religion to Cut the Apostates).46 For this article, I rely on 
the reproduction of the fatwa included in the aforementioned 
biography Tuḥfat al-zāʼir fī tārīkh al-Jazāʼir wa-al-Amir ̒ Abd al-Qādir (The 
Visitor’s Gem from the History of Algeria and Amir ʻAbd al-Qādir), 
but refer to the text using a shortened version of the original title: 
Ḥusām al-dīn.  
The amir’s ruling offers a window into how he mapped out his 
world and conceptualized the fight he was leading. Despite his 
hostility towards the Tijāni ̄yya Sufi brotherhood, there is no mention 
of different Sufi orders.47 This shows that al-Amīr ʻAbd al-Qādir drew 
lines on the basis of resistance versus accommodation, not on the basis 
of different branches of Sufism. ʻAbd al-Qādir avoids anything close to 
national designations other than a single mention of Ahl al-Jazāʼir (the 
people of Algeria) and of Muḥaqqiqīn Tūnis (the magistrates of Tunisia). 
He does not use the terms Europeans, colonizers, or Franks. In fact, it 
is not until after the failure of his state and his forced retreat into 
Morocco that he complains of “al-Fransīs” in a letter to the Mufti 
Muḥammad ‘Ulaysh in Egypt.48 Although ʻAbd al-Qādir previously 
lamented the state of “waṭan al-jazāʼir” in his istiftā’ to al-Tassūli ̄,49 he 
does not name any particular wat ̣an (homeland) in his own fatwa. ʻAbd 
al-Qādir only uses the term in the context of what not to place above 
religion, stating:  
 
There are two types of men who will enter under the protection 
of the unbelievers: the one who lies to God to ensure his worldly 
blessings—may God protect us from his ingratitude and 
insanity—and says, "I will die of hunger if I emigrate.” This 
makes him more apprehensive, as he thinks that his homeland 
[waṭan] is his provider [rāzaqahu] and not his Creator…or the 
man who is greedy for this world [al-dunya] and his love for it 
has made him blind and deaf, so he wants to succeed in it 
whether by Islam or by unbelief.50  




By not including any social markers other than the religious, he 
implicitly emphasizes that this is the only social boundary Maghribis 
need to consider. He then ties a love for the homeland with a love for 
this world, arguing that an undue attachment to either shows weakness 
of faith. It is not the homeland that provides, and thus there is no reason 
to fear leaving it. In fact, to think of the homeland as the provider is to 
commit idolatry as al-Rāzaq (the Provider) is one of God’s names. He 
then reminds Muslims that, in the Prophet’s time, when the fear of 
migration passed over the hearts of the believers, God sent down his 
verse: “And how many an animal there is that beareth not its own 
provision! Allah provideth for it and for you” (Qur’an 29:60). Building 
on this argument against attachment to the land, al-Amir ̒ Abd al-Qādir 
then refutes more potential reasons for not migrating.  
Al-Ami ̄r ʻAbd al-Qādir systematically rejects excuses for not 
performing hijra, stating that neither men who cannot afford to bring 
their families with them nor women whose husbands have not made 
hijra are exempt. The Ami ̄r asks: did not the Prophet perform hijra 
before he could bring his people with him? Were there not many 
women who made the first hijra to Abyssinia without their husbands? 
Taking a much more narrow interpretation of al-mustaḍʻafīn than the 
mufti of Algiers, ʻAbd al-Qādir states that Muslims with physical 
disabilities are only excused until they can find a guide to aid them.51 
He also quotes the tafsīr of Abū al-Saʻūd Afandī (1490–1574) as saying 
that the only theoretical excuse to not make hijra would be the lack of 
vastness of the Earth. Since the Earth is vast indeed, no possible reasons 
remain. ̒ Abd al-Qādir also dismisses the possibility of disguising one’s 
faith in order to remain in enemy lands by quoting the tafsīr of Ibn 
‘Abbas (619–687) which says this is not permissible now since—unlike 
during the Prophet’s time—al-bila ̄d al-Islamiyya are vast. 52  Relying 
namely on the Qur’an and the hadith, the amir then chastises the 
Islamic scholars who do not promote hijra, stating:  
 
For all of this type are among the ugliest of those entering under 
the rule of the infidels. They made all that is said about hijra, 
praising it and making it a duty in the Qur’an and the sunna 
absurd and meaningless. Not because of God's word, not 
because of the Prophet's word, but because of their vanities and 
their counterfeit sayings. For how could [these rulings] be when 
the Qur’an is full of mentions of hijra, praising making it and 
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condemning bypassing it? The Prophet, upon him be peace, 
said hijra is not suspended until the door to redemption is 
closed, and that is not until the sun rises from the West. And the 
Prophet, peace be upon him, said “I am innocent of every 
Muslim who lives among the infidels” according to the hadith 
narrators, except for al-Bukhari.53 
 
This passage effectively connects action and text, making it 
clear that when Muslims fail to conform to the Qur’an and the hadith—
the word of God and the word of the Prophet—they are making what 
should be the most infallible of books meaningless. Through his own 
interpretation of foundational texts and the incitement to action that he 
builds on them, the amir writes his own territory into this legacy. As 
Muslims who live under unbelievers’ rule have overstepped the 
boundaries of the faith through their lack of solidarity, they are the 
parallel of those Muhammad disassociated himself from. ʻAbd al-
Qādir then elaborates on affiliations that cannot cancel out the duty of 
hijra, ranking loyalty to Islam above all else:  
 
As for one who was a Muslim in Dar al-Islam and then the 
infidel invaded, for he may not imagine that there will be a 
community [ʻashīrah] to protect him. So then is there one from 
these peoples and tribes who has a community to protect him 
from the infidels? Who could protect him if the unbelievers 
wanted to enact a ruling upon him? Who could insure him 
against catastrophe and strife?54 
 
In this passage ʻAbd al-Qādir emphasizes that no tribe, no 
people, and no community can cancel out the need to live under Islamic 
rule. It is proximity to the Muslim ruler which matters most, as no 
person or people can protect Muslims from the social strife foreign rule 
brings. By implication, hijra becomes an act of redemption and an 
affirmation of social cohesion. Although the amir is adamant that God 
will provide for the believers, hijra is more than a migration for a better 
life in this world. Hijra is a means of cultural and spiritual survival 
which, in ʻAbd al-Qādir’s thought, are inseparable. Choosing another 
angle to weigh the sacrifices one must make in order to migrate, ʻAbd 
al-Qādir explains:  
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The Sufis noted that there are five necessities which must be 
protected: religion, the self, the mind, lineage, and wealth. So 
each of these must be preserved to the extent that it being 
protected does not conflict with protecting its predecessor. 
However, wealth is the last in the order and religion is the 
first.55 
 
Religion is threatened by non-Muslim rule. Although wealth may be 
threatened by emigration, it is a lower priority and not a factor which 
can override religion. Thus, again, ʻAbd al-Qādir is showing that there 
is no conscionable reason for a Muslim to not make hijra. What comes 
to the fore in all of these quotes is al-Amir ʻAbd al-Qādir’s insistence 
that Muslims not let any other loyalty override their solidarity with dār 
al-Islam. He makes the damning argument that to believe that it is the 
waṭan or one’s kinfolk rather than God who provides and sustains is 
tantamount to idolatry. After using the foundational Islamic texts to 
make this argument, he adds the founder of Maliki jurisprudence to his 
evidence stating that, “Al-Mālik, may God be pleased with him, said 
hijra from the lands of darkness and enmity is mandatory.”56  
Through both his citations and his examples, the amir makes 
hijra an integral part of Islamic practice. It is the Qur’an and the hadith 
along with the Prophetic example which fuel the amir’s argument, and 
he never implies that these sources need to be reinterpreted. Although 
contemporary histories of the Maghrib tend to take colonization as the 
dividing line between two fundamentally different periods, ʻAbd al-
Qādir does not portray his time as one of rupture. Nor does he imply 
that guidance for addressing the conflict with the French must be 
sought through reforming Islam. Instead, he contextualizes the 
invasion by evoking other times and places defined by changing 
boundaries between Muslims and Christians, starting with the 
beginning of Islam. He then warns his audience of what happened 
when the Muslims of Cordoba tried to hold a pact with the 
unbelievers.57  Finally, he maintains the hierarchy of precedence by 
explaining why he has not cited the four rightly guided caliphs:   
 
Know that this disaster which is the appearance of the 
unbelievers among the Muslims up to the point where they 
entered under [Christian] protection did not happen in the first 
century [hijra], nor the second, nor the third, nor the fourth, but 
rather it happened in the fifth and then afterwards. For this 
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reason, there is not a text or saying from the caliphs [al-aʼimmah], 
may God be pleased with them. So, when it happened and 
questions arose, our guides the theorists and interpreters 
weighed the issue of those who became Muslim and did not 
make hijra.58 
 
While al-Amir ʻAbd al-Qādir’s respect for precedence could be used to 
label him “traditional” and an exception to narratives of nineteenth-
century reform and revival, it is important to understand that 
preserving and transmitting the Islamic archive (as well as enacting it 
through proper interfaith conduct) was in itself a form of resistance to 
the violent enforcement of outsiders’ laws and norms.  
ʻAbd al-Qādir continues arguing for the mandatory nature of 
hijra by citing precedents from fiqh literature. In particular, he uses 
excerpts from al-Wansharīsi ̄’s fatwa collection al-Miʻyār al-muʻrib wa-
al-jāmiʻ al-mughrib ʻan fatāwī ʻulamāʼ Ifrīqīyah wa-al-Andalus wa-al-
Maghrib (The Express Standard and the Wondrous Collection of the 
Fatwas of the Scholars of Tunisia and Andalusia and Morocco).ʻAbd 
al-Qādir explains: “Al-Wansharīsi ̄ said in his book al-Miʻyār that 
fleeing from the domain (dar) where polytheism and destruction have 
taken over to the domain of safety and faith is mandatory,” and “the 
author of al-Miʻyār recorded that to be dispossessed of wealth is not an 
excuse [to not migrate].” 59  He also presents al-Wansharīsi ̄’s legal 
argument that the Muslim under non-Muslim rule will not be able to 
properly perform religious duties such as fasting, charity, pilgrimage, 
or jihad. This is because a Muslim judge and ruler are required to 
declare the beginning and end of Ramadan, and a Muslim ruler must 
be there to receive alms (zakat)—reasons which again point to the 
amir’s emphasis on how political structures must complement 
religious rites.  
Another question which al-Amir ʻAbd al-Qādir uses to address 
Islamic boundaries is the status of rulings issued by judges dwelling in 
dar al-Harb. ̒ Abd al-Qādir relates how al-Māzari ̄ (1061–1141) was asked 
about the rulings that came from the judges of Sicily and specified two 
matters of consideration: justice (ʻadālah) and authority (wilāya). As far 
as justice is concerned, no judge can execute it while living in dar al-
Ḥarb. Furthermore, the judge’s nomination by the infidels and their 
authority over him prevent his rulings from being legally valid.60 The 
testimony of Muslims who dwell in the wrong domain is also void, 
unless they have a legally approved reason for dwelling among the 
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infidels. Through making justice impossible without Islamic rule, ʻAbd 
al-Qādir reinforces the separation of dar al-Islam and dar al-Harb and 
cuts Muslims living in the latter out of Islamic textual and legal 
dialogues. He also condemns them to live in a state of injustice, even 
arguing—as did al-Tassūlī—that without Islamic rule, Christians 
themselves are unable to uphold agreements, explaining:  
 
Christians do not keep pacts unless the word of Islam is highest 
and its strength established. How could it be otherwise when 
God said they do not cease to fight you until they make you 
renounce your religion, if they are able to.... Those are the 
invaders, the trespassers. In other words, they don't stop at any 
condition or pact.61  
 
Since Christians do not stop at any condition or pact, it is up to 
the Muslims to enforce interfaith boundaries by following the Islamic 
ruler and living in his territory. Also including, when necessary, 
supporting the jihad whether with one’s resources, one’s body, or both. 
If there was no need to maintain separate spheres of influence between 
Muslims and non-Muslims, then there would not be any need to 
migrate or to resist invasion. This leads, naturally, to what should befall 
Muslims who fail to embody and enact these boundaries. ʻAbd al-
Qādir describes:  
 
The Imām al-Maghīli ̄ said in his book called “The Lanterns of 
Salvation” that those believers—meaning those which sought 
refuge with the infidels, and protected them, and took up 
residence in their domain, and abased themselves to obey 
them—their wealth is taken and they are killed, even if they 
were reading the Qur'an.62  
 
This passage fills in the gap left by the Qādī 'Abd al-Hādi ̄’s 
fatwa and uses precedence to support the amir’s right to use force 
against Muslims who aid, enable, or tolerate the enemy. The saying 
“Even if they are reading the Qur’an” is a vivid jab that gets at the heart 
of ʻAbd al-Qādir’s emphasis on solidarity. In his understanding of 
Islam, one is not truly Muslim—even if one is reading the holy book—
unless one is embedded within a Muslim community and living under 
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Islamic rule. Islamic practice means embodying Muslim solidarity and 
social cohesion, not simply performing decontextualized rites.  
In ʻAbd al-Qādir’s thought there is only one geographic 
division which matters: the boundaries between dar al-Islam and dar al-
Harb. He consistently uses dar in order to emphasize that he is talking 
about territory under Islamic dominion, not simply a land where 
Muslims live. Actual Islamic polities like the ‘Alawite and Ottoman 
sultanates are notably absent from the fatwa, even though the Ottoman 
Empire is referenced in some of his later texts. This is because neither 
the Ottomans nor the ‘Alawites were successfully repelling the 
invaders, and thus neither embodied a model of Islamic solidarity. This 
role was assigned to heroes of the distant past, including the 
Almoravid ruler Yūsuf ibn Tāshfīn (1009– 1106) and—the most distant 
and the most ideal—the Prophet Ibrahim. It was Ibrahim who was the 
original migrant, the one who wandered endlessly in search of a people 
who would accept the oneness of God, explains ʻAbd al-Qa ̄dir before 
he describes Ibrahim as “the beloved [of God]” and the first to make 
hijra a custom.63 
Texts like al-Amir ʻAbd al-Qādir’s ruling open a space for us to 
consider how authors, scholars, and political actors—in the North 
African context, often one and the same—understood the times they 
were living in prior to colonization and the imposition of European 
epistemologies. Al-Amir ʻAbd al-Qādir presented migration as both a 
spiritual duty and an expression of Islamic solidarity. He used the 
religious resonance of hijra as well as its history in the region to 
convince Maghribis that no fortune could outweigh the cost of living 
under infidel rule. He made migration more than a physical or political 
displacement—he made it the means to ensure the continuity of the 
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